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ABSTRACT:  A central question in terms of political (self-)selection relates to the 
incentives leading high ability individuals to enter – or abstain from entering – into 
politics. In this article, we use data from Italian municipalities over the period 1985-
2012 to empirically assess how changes in individuals’ expected payoffs affect political 
(self-)selection. Identification derives from murders of local politicians by the mafia, 
and indicates that such a negative shock to politicians’ expected payoffs induces a 
strong decrease in first-time elected politicians’ human capital. The effect is not limited 
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1. Introduction 
Following Besley’s (2005) pioneering study, economists have in recent years increased their 
interest in, and understanding of, the mechanisms driving political (self-)selection. An 
important topic thereby concerns the incentives leading high ability individuals to enter – or 
abstain from entering – into politics (and/or be selected as candidates by political parties). 
Previous work in this developing literature indicates that politicians’ remuneration and the 
degree of electoral competition can be important drivers in the political selection process. For 
instance, Galasso and Nannicini (2011) show that electoral competition increases parties’ 
incentives to select better candidates, while Gagliarducci and Nannicini (2013) find that 
higher wages tend to attract better educated individuals into politics. Besides these financial 
and political factors, the institutional framework of elections has also been found to play a 
critical role in modifying individuals’ expected payoffs and, in turn, political selection. For 
instance, the temporary introduction of reservation quotas in Italian municipalities has not 
only strongly increased the share of female politicians (De Paola et al. 2010), but also 
significantly improved the education level of elected politicians (Baltrunaite et al. 2014) – 
with lasting effects even after the removal of the quotas.  
 
In this paper, we investigate the impact on political selection of exogenous shocks in 
individuals’ expected payoffs linked to the presence of active criminal organizations in the 
political arena. Criminal organizations are equipped with substantial economic, military and 
political resources, and their detrimental economic effects have been extensively documented 
in a variety of contexts (Pinotti 2015). One mechanism explaining such negative economic 
effects lies in distortions in the allocation of public funds achieved by criminal organizations 
(Barone and Narcisio 2012; Acemoglu et al. 2013). Alternatively, however, criminal 
organizations may also distort the political selection process and induce the (s)election of 
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lower-ability politicians. Dal Bó et al. (2006) highlight this effect in a two-stage model where 
individuals in the first stage decide whether to run for public office (where wages are fixed) 
or join the private sector (where wages reflect individuals’ ability). In the second stage, 
elected politicians might direct a lump sum transfer to organized crime, which can use bribes 
and/or punishments to obtain such transfers. A central prediction of the model is that 
politically active criminal organizations reduce politicians’ expected payoffs independent of 
individuals’ decisions to accept bribes (and paying the cost of corruption), or reject them (and 
face punishment by the criminal organization).
1
 Consequently, higher ability individuals will 
self-select into private sector jobs rather than take up public office (for further details, see Dal 
Bó et al. 2006; Daniele and Geys 2015).  
 
The key contribution of this article lies in an empirical assessment of this theoretical 
prediction – i.e. politically active criminal organizations affect political (self-)selection by 
leading to an equilibrium outcome with lower-ability politicians taking office. Our 
identification of this effect derives from exogenous non-monetary shocks to individuals’ 
expected payoffs of entering politics due to murders of local politicians by criminal 
organizations in southern Italy. In the period 1975-2011, 132 Italian local politicians were 
murdered, most of them by criminal organisations (Lo Moro et al. 2015). The risk of being 
murdered represents an extreme case of ‘punishment’ in the context of Dal Bó et al.’s (2006) 
model, which can be credibly delivered by organized crime and arguably reflects a substantial 
negative expected payoff shock to (prospective) politicians. Matching this information on 
political murders to a detailed dataset on Italian local politicians’ education levels in three 
Southern Italian regions over the period 1985-2012, we can exploit variation across both time 
and space in political murders to derive causal inferences using a difference-in-difference 
                                                             
1 The reason is that organized crime will set the bribe equal to the cost of corruption minus the punishment. 
Hence, politicians will have the same cost from taking the bribe or the punishment. 
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approach. We thereby specifically focus on politicians in their first term in office (henceforth 
referred to as ‘first-time’ politicians) for two important reasons. First, compared to politicians 
already in power when a local politician is murdered, first-time politicians are less likely to 
be involved in any dynamic related to this murder. In fact, first-time politicians entering 
office during the first election after a political murder (our main ‘treatment’ group) simply 
were not politically active yet at the time of the murder, thus reducing any potential 
endogeneity concerns. Second, Dal Bo et al.’s (2006) model focuses on individuals’ choice to 




In line with expectations, our results highlight a sharp decline in first-time politicians’ 
average ability – as measured by their level of education (see also, for instance, Ferraz and 
Finan, 2008; Besley and Reynal-Querol, 2011; Besley et al., 2011; Galasso and Nannicini, 
2011; Daniele and Geys 2015; Martinez-Bravo 2015) – following the murder of a politician 
by organized crime within a municipality. We show that this drop in human capital 
immediately follows a political murder and does not arise from any already decreasing trend 
in politicians’ ability in such municipalities. The observed effect is not only statistically 
significant, but also substantively large (i.e. up to 50% of a standard deviation in first-time 
politicians’ average education level). Interestingly, the impact of a political murder on 
political selection is not contained to the municipality where a murder takes place, but also 
extends to neighbouring municipalities. Particularly, first-time politicians’ average education 
level in neighbouring municipalities shows a statistically significant decline after a political 
murder, which is about 30% of the effect uncovered in a municipality with a murder. Overall, 
these findings not only confirm that criminal organizations may distort the political selection 
process by inducing the (s)election of lower-ability politicians within and beyond the 
                                                             
2 It might also be that politicians already in office at the time of the murder are less affected by a change in 
political payoffs, since a hypothetical switch from politics to another sector might be costly. We will return to 
this in more detail below. 
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jurisdiction of their actual activity (Dal Bó et al. 2006). They also extend Gagliarducci and 
Nannicini’s (2013) findings on the effect of individuals’ expected financial payoffs for 
political selection to arguably non-monetary shifts in expected payoffs (i.e. life and death).  
 
In an important extension to our main analysis, we finally illustrate that these results are 
unlikely to be driven by a change in the “demand side” (i.e. a change in voters’ behaviour), 
and thus most likely reflect “supply side” decisions of the politicians themselves. Such 
demand side effects might arise if a political murder moves voters towards parties at the 
extremes of the political spectrum, which, in turn, might select less educated politicians. Our 
results indicate, however, that i) voters do not appear to change their voting patterns 
following a political murder, and ii) the findings are unchanged when controlling for the 
political party in power.  
 
In Section 2, we present a brief description of the institutional framework, including 
descriptive statistics on politicians murdered by organized crime. Section 3 discusses our 
empirical approach, and assesses the hypothesised negative link between politically active 
organized crime and politicians’ ability using mafia-murdered politicians as a source of 
identification. Section 4 provides a concluding discussion. 
 
2. Institutional Background 
2.1. Mafia-related murders 
In 2015, the Italian parliament undertook its first-ever survey of Italian local politicians killed 
since 1975. A parliamentary commission investigated the circumstances of all local 
politicians who suffered a violent death, and presented the results in a detailed report 
including all main facts of each incident (Lo Moro et al. 2015). The report indicates that 132 
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local politicians were murdered in the period 1975-2011, with no less than 97 of these 
murders showing links to organised crime. Figure 1 shows the distribution over time of these 
97 mafia-related murders. We focus on these murders in our analysis below because they 
most closely reflect the (extreme) ‘punishment’ by criminal organisations in Dal Bó et al.’s 
(2006) model, and as such can be expected to induce a substantial change in individuals’ 
(expected) payoffs from their political activities. Figure 1 shows that most mafia-related 
murders occurred before 1994, even though political murders still occur in more recent years. 
The years between 1988 and 1992 witnessed a dramatic upsurge in mafia-related murders, 
which is linked to a period of dramatic conflict between Italian institutions and the mafia. 
Following the approval of a stricter national-level legislation aimed at fighting organized 
crime and the massive incarceration of high level criminals, violent attacks against 
institutions culminated in the murders of two popular anti-mafia judges – Giovanni Falcone 
and Paolo Borsellino – a few months apart in 1992 (Dickie, 2005).  
 
Figure 2 instead visualizes the geographical distribution of these murders across the 20 Italian 
regions. It is evident from figure 2 that most of the murders are concentred in Sicily, Calabria 
and Campania. This is unsurprising since these are the three southern Italian regions where 
organized crime has been strongly active in the last decades. The observed concentration of 
political murders in these three regions also motivates our choice to focus the empirical 
analysis on these regions (about 1.350 municipalities). Since our identification strategy 
requires a sufficiently similar ‘control’ group for the municipalities ‘treated’ with a mafia-
related political murder, a focus on southern Italy is critical from a theoretical perspective 
because we effectively include only municipalities that are sufficiently comparable except for 
the fact that a mafia-related murder occurred in a given jurisdiction. Hence, it leads to a 
6
“more homogenous sample for those unobserved characteristics (political culture, social 
capital) (…) that can affect the estimation” (Sberna, 2011, p. 15). 
_______________________ 
Figures 1 and 2 about here 
_______________________ 
 
2.2. Local political system 
Local government in Italy is organised along a parliamentary system, and consists of a 
legislative branch (Consiglio, or local council) and an executive branch (Giunta, or local 
government). Both local political institutions are headed by the mayor. During municipal 
elections, citizens directly elect the councillors (Consiglieri) and – since 1993 – the mayor 
(Sindaco). Importantly, not all 8000 Italian municipalities hold elections at the same time, but 
they do operate on an electoral cycle of similar length (i.e. five years). After an election, the 
mayor is in charge of appointing a certain number of aldermen (Assessori) depending on the 
population size of the municipality. Municipal councils have important powers in terms of 
local taxes (particularly taxes on property) and the provision of public goods (for instance, 
culture and recreation, transport, economic development, education, waste management, local 
police and social welfare).  
 
3. Empirical Analysis 
3.1 Estimation Strategy 
As explained above, we expect mafia-related murders of a politician to induce a negative 
shock in individuals’ expected payoffs from entering politics, which leads to a decrease in the 
average education level of politicians elected after the murder. Our empirical analysis to 
verify this hypothesis relies on a difference-in-difference approach comparing municipalities 
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with/without a politician murdered before/after a murder, thereby focusing on municipalities 
in Sicily, Calabria and Campania in the period 1985-2012.
3
 In our specification, we consider 
only electoral years since the political selection process works through elections. Yet, given 
the quasi-randomly distributed five-year electoral cycle across Italian municipalities (see 
above), each year in our sample has a substantial number of municipal elections taking place. 
The baseline specification is: 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑀𝑢𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡   (1) 
Where i refers to municipality and t to year. Y measures local politicians’ ability level via the 
average educational attainment among first-time elected politicians in municipality i at the 
end of a certain electoral year. Specifically, following De Paola and Scoppa (2010) and 
Daniele and Geys (2015), we measure education as the minimum number of years necessary 
to obtain a certain degree (i.e. no education = 0 years; primary education = 5 years; lower 
secondary = 8 years; higher secondary = 13 years; university or more = 18 years). The data 
on politicians’ education are available on the website of the Italian Ministry of Interior.  
 
Our main explanatory variable, AfterMurder, is an indicator variable set to one in 
municipalities hit by a murder only in the years after the murder (0 otherwise). Specifically, 
we focus on the next 10 years following a murder (i.e. the two following electoral rounds). 
To control for potential sources of heterogeneity across municipalities, we introduce 
municipality fixed effects (𝛼𝑖). We also include year fixed effects (𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡) to control for time 
varying changes common to all municipalities. Furthermore, we introduce municipality-level 
time-varying variables to control for important socio-economic changes over the period of 
our analysis: i.e. population size, unemployment rate and the share of citizens with a 
                                                             
3 The starting point of the dataset is determined by the availability of information on local politicians’ socio-
demographic characteristics. No such information is available prior to 1985. Note that this restricts the number 
of murders in our sample to 43 (the total number is 97, see Section 2.1). 
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university degree. As those variables are collected at the municipality level every ten years, 
we linearly interpolate them to obtain yearly observations (specifically, we use data from 
Italian census in 1981, 1991, 2001 and 2011). Finally, in some specifications, we furthermore 
introduce province-year fixed effects. This allows controlling for time-varying changes, 
which might take place at the provincial level. Standard errors are clustered at the 
municipality level (Bertrand et al., 2004).  
 
3.2 Main results 
Our main results regarding the impact of a political murder by criminal organizations on the 
average education level of first-time politicians elected after this murder took place are 
summarized in table 1. The top panel includes the entire sample. In the bottom panel, we 
again consider the entire sample, but now introduce separate indicator variables for elections 
taking place more or less than five years after a murder: i.e., 1_to_5_AftMurder equals one 
only for the period within five years after the murder (0 otherwise), while 
6_to_10_AftMurder equals one only for the period longer than five years after the murder (0 
otherwise). In most cases, there is only one election in these five year periods (since elections 
generally take place every five years). However, in some cases the early dissolution of the 
city council can lead to multiple elections in a five year period. In such cases, we include 
politicians elected for the first time during both these elections in our estimate sample. 
Columns 1 through 4 differ only in terms of the exact specification employed. In column 1, 
we exclude municipality-level time-varying controls as well as province-year fixed effects. 
Columns 2 and 3 include one of these sets of variables, while column (4) presents our most 
complete specification with municipality-level time-varying controls and province-year fixed 
effects. Finally, in column (5) of each panel, we replicate the model of column (4) including 
in the sample only municipalities where a murder took place. Although this drastically 
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reduces our sample, it represents a very strict test as the control group includes only 
municipalities where a murder will take place, at some point, in the future.  
 
_______________________ 
Table 1 about here 
_______________________ 
The specifications in table 1 confirm a statistically significant and substantively large drop in 
the average education level of first-time politicians after a mafia-related political murder. The 
estimated effect size in the first two panels ranges from one to one and a half years of lower 
education. This is approximately 10% of the average education level of first-time politicians 
(i.e. 12.95 years) and corresponds to 40%-50% of a standard deviation in these individuals’ 
education levels. These findings provide strong evidence in favour of the idea that criminal 
organizations distort the political selection process by inducing the (s)election of lower-
ability politicians (Dal Bó et al. 2006). Furthermore, the bottom panel of table 1 indicates that 
this effect tends to be fairly persistent. Although the estimated effects are naturally more 
pronounced in the first election after a murder, they remain statistically significant and 
relatively large also for first-time politicians elected during the second election after a 
murder.
4
 Finally, previous findings are in line with the results in column (5) when we restrict 
the sample to municipalities where a murder took place. In this case, the coefficient reaches a 
10% significance level only in one case. However, this is likely due to the small sample size 
(i.e. less than 150 observations). Importantly the sign and the size of the coefficients are 
similar to the ones estimated on the entire sample. 
 
                                                             
4 To preserve space, we do not show the coefficients of the control variables. The only significant control 
variable turns out to be the level of education of the municipal population, which is positively associated with 
the average education of first-time politicians. 
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Clearly, it is important to verify at this point that the drop in first-time politicians’ human 
capital follows a political murder rather than reflects an already declining trend in education 
levels in the affected municipalities. To test this, we check for the presence of a decreasing 
trend in first-time politicians’ education levels before the political murder takes place. 
Specifically, table 2 replicates the estimation model presented in the top panel of table 1, 
except that we now focus on the period before the murder. That is, we introduce indicator 
variables equal to 1 only in the five years before a murder (5_to_1_BefMurder; 0 otherwise) 
or in the six to ten years before a murder (10_to_6_BefMurder; 0 otherwise). The former 
generally corresponds to the last election before the murder, while the latter looks one 
election further into the past. Absence of a declining trend in education levels prior to a 
mafia-related political murder would be reflected in an insignificant difference between the 
coefficient estimates of both variables. 
_______________________ 
Table 2 about here 
_______________________ 
The results from Table 2 are at odds with any decreasing trend in the education level of first-
time elected politicians before the murder. In all estimations, the difference between the 
coefficients of 5_to_1_BefMurder and 10_to_6_BefMurder remains substantively very small 
and statistically insignificant (p-values below 0.10 in all cases). This indicates that the drop in 
education documented in table 1 takes place only after the murder of a politician and is not 
catching a decreasing trend that started before the murder occurred.  
 
Another potential concern might arise because our analysis includes only first-time 
politicians, who obviously represent a subset of all elected politicians. It is important to 
observe, however, that in our Italian municipal setting such first-time politicians represent a 
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very significant share of the overall population. Indeed, in the average local election, 14% of 
all elected politicians are elected for the first time (see also Daniele and Geys 2015). 
Moreover, since the bottom panel of table 1 indicates a significant degree of persistence 
beyond the first election after a political murder, the group of affected first-time politicians 
will be even higher. Even so, one might wonder to what extent our results likewise arise 
when considering the average human capital of the entire group of elected politicians. 
Assuming that switching to another sector is costly once individuals have invested in a 
political career, politicians already in office at the time of the murder could be less affected 
by a change in political payoffs (see also note 2). To assess this, we replicate the analysis in 
the top panel of Table 1 using the average education level of all elected politicians (rather 
than first-time politicians) as the dependent variable. 
_______________________ 
Table 3 about here 
_______________________ 
The results in table 3 indicate that there is also a statistically significant drop in politicians’ 
human capital after a mafia-related murder when looking at the full sample of politicians. Yet, 
the estimate effect size is substantially smaller compared to our earlier results for first-time 
politicians – approximately one third of the effect size observed in table 1. This clearly 
implies that the main effects observed in table 1 are mostly driven by first-time elected 
politicians. This is in line with the idea that a political murder has a stronger impact on the 
expected payoffs from political office among individuals who have not yet entered into 





3.3 Spillover Effects 
So far, our interest has been limited to documenting political selection effects within the 
municipality where a mafia-related political murder occurred. Prospective politicians in these 
municipalities are clearly most directly affected by a political murder, and changes in 
individuals’ expected payoffs from a political career will therefore be largest within the 
affected municipality. Nevertheless, since the average municipality in southern Italy is fairly 
small (i.e. less than 4000 inhabitants), travel distances are limited and the presence of 
criminal organizations is widespread across Southern Italian regions, we might expect the 
effects of a political murder to ‘spill over’ beyond the boundaries of the affected municipality. 
Citizens considering a political career might indeed take a political murder in neighbouring 
municipalities as a signal for the expected payoffs from politics also in their own 
municipality. In other words, they might infer from the occurrence of a local politician’s 
murder nearby that such events may likewise occur with some positive probability in their 
own municipality.  
 
To test this hypothesis, we again replicate the analysis in the top panel of table 1, but now 
focus on any effects of a political murder in neighbouring municipalities. The results are 
presented in table 4. The central variable of interest in the top panel (After Murder Neighbour) 
equals one for the period after a political murder occurring in a neighbouring municipality (0 
otherwise). In the bottom panel, we simultaneously introduce After Murder and After Murder 
Neighbour in order to allow for a more direct comparison of their respective effects. Before 
turning to the results, it should be noted that, from a methodological perspective, the 
existence of any such spillover effects helps rule out concerns of potential endogeneity issues 
in our main analysis. The reason is that a political murder in a neighbouring municipality 
cannot possible be ascribed to any event taking place within individuals’ own municipality.  
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_______________________ 
Table 4 about here 
_______________________ 
The results in the top panel of table 4 show that a political murder in a nearby municipality 
negatively affects the average education level of first-time politicians elected after this 
murder occurs. The drop is statistically significant at the 90% confidence level throughout all 
specifications, and the estimated effect size equals approximately five to six months of lower 
education (which is about 30% of the effect observed in a municipality hit by a political 
murder). The bottom panel of Table 4 confirms that, unsurprisingly, the spillover effect is 
substantively smaller than the main effect observed in a municipality where the murder 
occurs (note that the difference between the two coefficients is statistically significant at the 
95% confidence level in all cases). Nonetheless, the existence of such spillover effect per se 
highlights that the detrimental effects of a political murder on political selection can spread 
across municipal borders. Hence, criminal organizations may distort the political selection 
process by inducing the (s)election of lower-ability politicians both within (table 1) and 
beyond (table 3) the jurisdiction of their actual activity. 
 
3.3 Demand- vs. Supply-Side Effects 
Our interpretation thus far effectively assumes that our findings are driven by a change in 
political selection: i.e. in the type of individuals entering in politics. We might call this the 
“supply side” of this market. However, changes might conceivably also take place on the 
“demand side”: i.e. in voters’ political preferences. For instance, a political murder may shift 
voters’ preferences towards more extremist parties, which might select less educated 
politicians. If so, this could represent an alternative explanation for the observed drop in first-
time politicians’ human capital. We assess this possibility in two ways.  
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 First, in table 5, we replicate the analysis using the probability of observing a certain political 
party in power. Specifically, the dependent variable in this case in an indicator variable equal 
to one if a certain political party is in power in a city i in year t (0 otherwise). We thereby 
consider four type of parties: civic lists, centrist parties, left-wing parties and right-wing 
parties. The results indicate that the coefficient of interest on After Murder is not statistically 
significant in any specification. Therefore, there does not appear to be any observable shift in 
voters’ political preferences following a political murder within the municipality.  
_______________________ 
Tables 5 and 6 about here 
_______________________ 
Second, in table 6, we replicate the analysis in the top panel of Table 1 while directly 
controlling for the political colour of the winning party in the election. Specifically, we 
include a number of indicator variables equal to one when civic lists, left-wing parties or 
right-wing parties, respectively, are victorious in the election. The results indicate that when a 
right-wing party gains power, the average level of education of first-time politicians is 
slightly lower compared to the control group represented by municipalities ruled by a centrist 
party. Yet, this results is not robust over the various specifications. More importantly, 
however, inclusion of these additional control variables leaves the statistical significance and 
the size of the coefficient estimate for After Murder qualitatively unchanged. 
 
4. Conclusion 
A central question in terms of political (self-)selection relates to the incentives leading high 
ability individuals to enter – or abstain from entering – into politics. In this study, using data 
from Italian municipalities over the period 1985-2012, we empirically assess how changes in 
15
individuals’ non-monetary expected payoffs affect political (self-)selection. The 
identification of this effect exploits exogenous shocks in individuals’ expected payoffs of 
entering politics due to murders of local politicians by criminal organizations in southern 
Italy. 
 
Our results show that first-time elected politicians’ ability (measured by their levels of 
education) is strongly (up to 50% of a standard deviation) reduced after a shock represented 
by the murder of a local politician by organised crime. This is in line with Dal Bó et al. 
(2006), as a murder of a local politician arguably might represent a sudden drop in politicians’ 
expected payoffs, which, in turn, leads to relatively lower-ability individuals entering into 
politics. To strengthen our findings, we show that: i) the drop precisely follows a political 
murder and it is not catching up any pre-trend; ii) the results are not driven by a change in 
voters’ behaviors as they do not change political preferences after the shock. Finally, we 
show that such detrimental effects spread to nearby municipalities where the education level 
of first-time elected politicians are significantly reduced.  
 
Overall, our results can be read in a pessimistic light, as we show that the mafia has a 
meaningful negative impact on political selection which might spread in the surrounding 
geographical areas. However, in a recent study, Daniele and Geys (2015) show that law 
enforcement might be a useful tool to reduce organized crime’s influence on political 
selection among Southern Italian municipalities. Specifically, following a law enforcement 
aimed at reducing the impact of criminal organizations on politics, the average education of 
the elected politicians substantially increase. Therefore, it appears that individuals, when 
deciding to enter in politics, take into account both negative and positive changes in their 
expected payoffs. This should motivate further studies exploring under which circumstances 
16
political selection can be improved, as “no society can run effective public institutions while 
ignoring the quality of who is recruited to public office and what they stand for” (Besley, 
2005, p. 58). 
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Table 1: Effect of a political murder on first-time politicians’ human capital 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
After Murder -1.158 -1.198 -1.426 -1.476 -1.925 
 (2.45)** (2.52)** (2.88)*** (2.95)*** (1.64) 
Municipality FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Controls NO YES NO YES YES 
Province-Year FE NO NO YES YES YES 
R
2
 0.09 0.09 0.17 0.17 0.80 
N 6,338 6,306 6,338 6,306 138 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  
1_to_5_AftMurder -1.389 -1.431 -1.577 -1.627 -2.051 
 (2.16)** (2.20)** (2.55)** (2.59)*** (1.33) 
6_to_10_AftMurder -0.971 -1.009 -1.288 -1.337 -1.769 
 (1.74)* (1.81)* (2.04)** (2.12)** (1.73)* 
Municipality FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Controls NO YES NO YES YES 
Province-Year FE NO NO YES YES YES 
R2 0.09 0.09 0.17 0.17 0.80 
N 6,338 6,306 6,338 6,306 138 
Note: The table shows the results from a difference-in-difference regression analysis using first-time elected 
politicians’ years of education as dependent variable. AfterMurder equals one in municipalities where a 
politician is murder by organized crime in the period after the murder (=0 otherwise). Controls includes: 
LogPop, (the logarithm of the population), Per_Degree (the percentage of citizens with a university degree) and 
Per_Unemployment (the percentage of unemployed over the municipality population). 1_to_5_AftMurder and 
6_to_10_AftMurder equal one in municipalities where a politician is murdered by organized crime in the years 
after the murder (=0 otherwise), respectively one to five years after the murder; five to ten years after the murder. 





Table 2: Effect of a political murder on politicians’ human capital: pre-trends 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  
5_to_1_BefMurder 0.958 0.950 1.106 1.103 1.115 
 (2.02)** (2.00)** (2.18)** (2.16)** (0.85) 
10_to_6_BefMurder 0.905 0.900 1.362 1.371 0.204 
 (0.84) (0.84) (1.17) (1.19) (0.14) 
Municipality FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Controls NO YES NO YES YES 
Province-Year FE NO NO YES YES YES 
R2 0.09 0.09 0.17 0.17 0.80 
N 6,338 6,306 6,338 6,306 138 
Note: The table shows the results from a difference-in-difference regression analysis using first-time elected 
politicians’ years of education as dependent variable. BefMurder1to5 and BefMurder5to10 equal one in 
municipalities where a politician is murdered by organized crime in the years before the murder (=0 otherwise), 
respectively one to five years before the murder; five to ten years before the murder. LogPop is the logarithm of 
the population, Per_Degree is the percentage of citizens with a university degree; Per_Unemployment is the 
percentage of unemployed over the municipality population. T-statistics based on standard errors clustered at the 




Table 3 – Effect of a political murder on politicians’ human capital (entire sample) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
After Murder -0.439 -0.436 -0.504 -0.494 
 (2.00)** (2.00)** (2.17)** (2.13)** 
Municipality FE YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Controls NO YES NO YES 
Province-Year FE NO NO YES YES 
R
2
 0.09 0.09 0.17 0.17 
N 6,292 6,260 6,292 6,260 
Note: The table shows the results from a difference-in-difference regression analysis using politicians’ years of 
education as dependent variable. AfterMurder equals one in municipalities where a politician is murdered by 
organized crime in the period after the murder (=0 otherwise). Controls includes: LogPop, (the logarithm of the 
population), Per_Degree (the percentage of citizens with a university degree) and Per_Unemployment (the 
percentage of unemployed over the municipality population). T-statistics based on standard errors clustered at 
the municipality level in brackets. * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
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Table 4: Effect of a political murder on first-time politicians in nearby municipalities 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
After Murder Neighbour -0.408 -0.422 -0.506 -0.525 
 (1.71)* (1.76)* (1.88)* (1.92)* 
Municipality FE YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Controls NO YES NO YES 
Province-Year FE NO NO YES YES 
R
2
 0.09 0.09 0.17 0.17 
N 6,200 6,168 6,200 6,168 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
After Murder Neighbour -0.375 -0.390 -0.460 -0.478 
 (1.60) (1.65)* (1.75)* (1.80)* 
After Murder -1.232 -1.247 -1.503 -1.522 
 (2.24)** (2.26)** (2.58)** (2.59)*** 
Municipality FE YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Controls NO YES NO YES 
Province-Year FE NO NO YES YES 
R2 0.09 0.09 0.17 0.17 
N 6,292 6,260 6,292 6,260 
Note: The table shows the results from a difference-in-difference regression analysis using first-time elected 
politicians’ years of education as dependent variable. AfterMurder equals one in municipalities where a 
politician is murdered by organized crime in the period after the murder (=0 otherwise). AfterMurde 
Neighbour equals one in the period after a political murder in municipalities neighbouring of the 
municipality where a political murder occurs (=0 otherwise).  Controls includes: LogPop, (the logarithm 
of the population), Per_Degree (the percentage of citizens with a university degree) and 
Per_Unemployment (the percentage of unemployed over the municipality population). T-statistics based 




Table 5: Effect of a political murder on parties’ vote shares 
 Civic Left Right Centre 
After Murder -0.093 0.031 0.051 0.001 
 (1.22) (0.42) (1.11) (0.02) 
Municipality FE YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Controls YES YES YES YES 
Province-Year FE YES YES YES YES 
R2 0.48 0.20 0.22 0.37 
N 6,876 6,876 6,876 6,876 
Note: The table shows the results from a difference-in-difference regression analysis using the political colour of 
the winning party at the municipal as dependent variable (i.e. Civic List, Left Pary, Right Party and Centre 
Party). AfterMurder equals one in municipalities where a politician is murdered by organized crime in the five 
years after the murder (=0 otherwise). Controls includes: LogPop, (the logarithm of the population), 
Per_Degree (the percentage of citizens with a university degree) and Per_Unemployment (the percentage of 
unemployed over the municipality population). T-statistics based on standard errors clustered at the municipality 




Table 6: Effect of a political murder on politicians’ human capital: Control for winning party 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
After Murder -1.137 -1.176 -1.415 -1.465 
  (2.37)** (2.44)** (2.84)*** (2.92)*** 
Civic 0.014 0.012 0.043 0.043 
  (0.11) (0.10) (0.31) (0.31) 
Left 0.035 0.031 0.065 0.058 
  (0.32) (0.28) (0.53) (0.48) 
Right -0.241 -0.241 -0.176 -0.173 
  (1.71)* (1.71)* (1.15) (1.13) 
Municipality FE YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Controls NO YES NO YES 
Province-Year FE NO NO YES YES 
R2 0.09 0.09 0.17 0.17 
N 6,292 6,260 6,292 6,260 
Note: The table shows the results from a difference-in-difference regression analysis using first-time elected 
politicians’ years of education as dependent variable. AfterMurder equals one in municipalities where a 
politician is murdered by organized crime in the period after the murder (=0 otherwise). Controls includes: 
LogPop, (the logarithm of the population), Per_Degree (the percentage of citizens with a university degree) and 
Per_Unemployment (the percentage of unemployed over the municipality population). T-statistics based on 




Figure 1- Politicians killed by organized crime over time 
 

























































Figure 2- Politicians killed by organized crime across regions 
 





































Appendix A: Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Education First-Time Elected 6345 12.9486 2.934142 0 18 
Education All Elected 6906 13.11656 1.73788 5 18 
After Murder 6966 0.009331 0.0961525 0 1 
After Murder Neighbour 6967 0.1197072 0.3246421 0 1 
Log Population 6924 8.197016 1.10859 5.473111 14.0081 
Percent_Degree  6924 3.68683 2.876289 0 42.37724 
Percent_Unemployment  6924 5.938084 3.075562 0.0761615 41.7949 
Civic List 6919 0.3285157 0.4697074 0 1 
Left Party 6919 0.2548056 0.4357834 0 1 
Right Party 6919 0.087874 0.283132 0 1 
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